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In the late nineteenth century the Afrikaner frontier expanded 
dmaatically. Boer settlements were established in several places along the great 
arc of highland territory which runs from southern Namibia throw Angola to 
Zimbabwe. The Kalahari became a kind of IIBoer Lakef1, crossed in all directions by 
the ponderous ox-waggons of the trekkers. This process has been obscured by the 
attention given to colonial partition, which divided the lands of the Kalahari basin 
between several powers, and yet this new Boer frontier posed problems of considerable 
interest. This is p&ticularly true in the case of the Angola Boers, for here the 
trekkers encountered a similarly expanding Portuguese frontier of settlement, based 
on Mossamedes and Benguela. The interaction between two culturally dissimilar 
groups of settlers, and between the white settlers and the autonomous African 
polities, provides an illuminating case study for many of the problems raised by 
Martin Legassick in his paper on the frontier tradition. (1) 
But before turning to these problems it is worth rapidly sketching out the 
general history of the Angola Boers, and their place in traditional South African 
historiogmipw. (2) The first Thirstland Trekkers left the Transvaal in thzee ' 
groups between 1874 and 1877, and wandered about in the Okavango Delta and the 
Kaokoveld for several years, suffering considerable losses. The 270 survivors 
finally arrived in the Huila highlands of Angola in early 1881 and settled at Humpata, 
on the road inlmd from Mossamedes. Dissatisfaction with this area soon arose, and 
in 1884 roughly half the trekkers moved off again. A few returned to the Transvaal, 
but the majority set up the ItRepublic of Upin&oniafl in the Grootfontein region of 
northern Namibia. The "Republicv soon collapsed, and in 1888 most of the Boers 
returned to Humpata. 
Between 1892 and 1895 a much larger trek arrived from the Transvaal in 
several gmups. The Humpata settlement was reinforced, and two new settlements 
were founded, at Caconda and Bih6, on the road inland from Benguela. Many of the new 
arrivals wished to trek on further, and proposals from King Leopold to settle in 
Katanga were considered. (3) Plans were also made to set up a colony in the Lake 
Ngami region. (4) Both these schemes fell through, so in 1895-1896 30 families 
trekked south to settle around Grootfontein. Portuguese statistics for 1900 show a 
little over 1,000 Boers in Angola, compared with about 2,500 Portuguese settlers in 
the same area. (5) Yet another wave of Afrikaners entered Angola after the Boer War, 
so that by 1905 there were about 1,500 of them all told. This was the last major 
influx, iWd in 1928 nearly 2,000 Boers trekked out of AYlgola to settle in Namibia. 
A few remained behind, and in the 1950s the Boer population of Angola was estimated 
at about 500 souls. (6) 
In traditional South African historiograpm, the Thirstland Trek is treated 
as a single episode, the later and larger treks being more or less completely ignored. 
It is assimilated to the stereotypes of the Great Trek, as in this quotation which 
L. G. Green attributes to a veteran of the Thirstland: "A drifting spirit was in our 
hearts, and we ourselves could not understand it. We just sold our farms and set out 
north-westwards to find a new home." (7) Fear of British encroachments, and the 
desire to preserve religious and cultural identity, are added for good measure. The 
actual activities of the Boers in Angola are treated as the calm life of a big happy 
family, interspersed with heroic expeditions against African tribes. And the 1928 
move to Namibia is presented as a return to the Afrikaner fold, away from the 
domination of a foreign power. (8) 
In contradistinction to this romantic stereotyped story, I would like to 
focus on five specific problems: responses to economic stimuli; social 
stratification and political divisions within the community; relations with other 
white groups; relations with autonomous African groups; and relations with African 
servants and clients. The responses to economic stimuli can be subdivided into a 
"push factor" and a llpull factor", and I shall first try to determine the economic 
reasons that impelled the Boers to leave the Transvaal. 
The recollections of an old trekker (9) present the first Thirstland Trek 
mainly as a reaction to the extremely depressed economic conditions prevailing in 
the Transvaal in the early 1870s. The elephant frontier had retreated far to the 
north; the Transvaal had no railways, no industries, no mines; money was in short 
supply and cattle were the only commodity of trade. But very enthusiastic reports 
were coming in from Damarala;nd, where the ivory and ostrich-feather traae was in full 
swing, and the land was said to be excellent for cattle. And the country was as yet 
claimed by no European power. (10) The first Thirstland Trek thus appears here in 
quite a different light, as one of the consequences of the collapse of the early 
hunting economy of the Transvaal. (11) 
If one then considers the second avld largest trek (1892-1895), the 
dominant reasons for leaving the Transvaal had changed somewhat. The flourishing 
economic situation of the earlier trekkers provided one attraction, but more 
important seems to have been the land question. It must be emphasized that this had 
nothing to do with the traditional picture of a fertile asld superabundant population, 
unable to provide lands for the younger generation. The problem was rather one of 
growing economic differentiation within white Transvaal society, between the la~ge 
landowners and their tenants. (12) Resentment at having to rent l&, and the 
attractions of abundant freehold land in Namibia and Angola,were powerful factors 
leading the Boers to trek across the Kalahari. The rumour that three Ulish land 
companies were buying up land in southern Angola to rent it out to the new Boer 
immigrants created a small panic, and the Portuguese authorities had to go to 
considerable lengths to deny it. (13) 
The third trek of the early 1900s is that on which I have found the least 
material. On the face of it, these were Boers escaping British domination. (14) 
It would seem probable, however, that important economic factors also underlay these 
treks, particularly the renewed possibilities of mercenary service in Angola (1902- 
1907), to which I shall shortly return, and the aggravation of the laad problem in 
the Transvaal. (15) 
Once in Angola, the trekkers did not set up the isolated subsistence 
pastoral communities dear to the frontier tradition. On the contrary, they reacted 
aggressively and shrewdly to the market forces operating on the Angola frontier. (16) 
They always maintained rural bases, where the women indulged in a little cereal 
cultivation and African herdsmen tended the cattle. But in the main they 
concentrated exclusively on the most lucrative forms of economic activity that their 
skills permitted. They had come in the first place to perpetuate the hunting 
econonny of the Transvaal, but they quickly adapted to the new conditions, becoming 
primarily transport riders and mercenaries, and keeping hunting as a subsidiary 
though important activity. 
The arrival of the Boers in Humpata initiated a minor transport revolu,, 
Hitherto everything had been carried by head-porters. Now, in the whole southern 
third of Angola suitable for oxen the Boers opened up waggon tracks, built and 
repaired two major roads inland from Mossamedes and Bengaela, set up artisanal 
workshops to build and repair waggons, and tenaciously defended a transport monopol 
which was not seriously breached till about 1910. The real boom in the transpor 
business began in about 1890, when the road inland from Benguela was built and lar 
quantities of root rubber began to be exported from Angola. Although the Boers 
never managed to wrest more than a part of the rubber carrying business from the 
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Ovimbundu porters, it was nevertheless extremely lucrative, and the 1890s influx 
from the Transvaal seems to have been closely correlated to the rubber boom. Indee 
van der Merwe states g.uite clearly that the sole reason for founding the Bih6 
sett1emen.t (in country not very suited to cattle) was to profit from the rubber 
carrying possibilities. (17) 
Mercenary service on Portuguese expeditions was even more lucrative than 
transport riding, but was much more irregular. Large scale expeditions into the 
interior occurred between 1885 and 1890, 1902 and 1907, and 1914 and 1915, on an 
almost yearly basis. But in between were lean years, in which military activity 
very much reduced. The Portuguese appreciated the Boers' skill as waggon-drivers, 
essential for the logistics of military expeditions, and their extraordinary accusal 
in traclting and shooting, gained from their hunting activities. They were paid a 
fixed daily wage, sometimes doubled during the actual days of fighting, plus extras 
for every horse and waggon, and 500h of all cattle looted. Any horses, oxen or 
waggons lost were compensated, and ammunition was provided free. Rifles were issue 
to those who had ancient models. (18) Much haggling always took place over the exa 
terms, and the Boers were quite prepared suddenly to leave the Portuguese in the 
lurch, at the mercy of the Africans, if the agceed number of days were over and f 
Portuguese would not negotiate a new agreement. (19) 
By the time the Boers reached Angola, the great days of elephant and 
ostrich hunting were almost oves. k few Afrikaners continued to specialise ir 
elephant hunting, b3t the majority of them hunted partly for their oiin subsistenc 
but more often to trade the meat with the Africans. They developed a quasi-mono2ol 
on the trade for meat in exchange for cereals, often buying cattle at the end of -L' 
process. (20) However, they never seem to have braached out beyond thLs forn of 
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petty trade, large scale trade remziining in the hands of the Portuguese and foreigc 
merchant community. 
This flourishing economic system began to be increasingly eroded after th 
First World War. The completion of the Eenguela Railww, the arrival of the 
Mossamedes Railway in the Huila highlands, the building of motor roads and the 
increasing use of lorries, all combined to ruin the Boer transport. industry, alread 
challenged since about 1910 by the growth of local Portuguese waggoning 
competition. (21) With the final defeat of the Kwanyama in 1915, opportunities for 
mercenary service came to an end. And hunting was made increasingly difficult by 
tighter Portuguese legislation, particularly regulating the possession of rifles an 
hunting licences. It is in this light that one must view the 1928 trek into N a b j  
although the Portuguese attempts to t7nationalise" the Boers also played their 
part. (22) 
The evidence for social stratification corresponding to this strong marke 
orientation is fragmentary but suggestive. Portuguese statistics for 1882-1889 s5o 
a very uneven distribution of land, labour and horses in the Huapata settlement. 
Ten years later, land concessions in the Huila highlanas vary from 2 hectares to 80 
hectares, the average being about 50 hectares. (23) Jan Harm Robbertse, the larges 
landowner, also engaged in large scale hunting for ivory, in road b~~ilding, cattle 
ranching and fruit faming and had an important strzke in the Cassinga gold aines. (23 
Associated with Robbertse one constantly comes across about a dozen men d l o  sre 
prominent in various fields, and are referred to as "influentialtt or "respected". 
It is interesting to note that the "exceedingly wealthy1' Lucas van der Neme did no 
trek across the Thirstland, but loaded his WC-ggons and horses on a ship at Cape T 
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and came by sea with a few companions to Mossamedes. (26) At the other end of the 
social scale, there are occasional references to impoverished families, and to 
"elements of little or no respectabilitytf. (27) More interesting is the fact that a 
sizable proportion of the Humpata Boers could not send their children to the Dutch 
school because they were too poor to have African labour and needed their children 
at home. (28) 
Political divisions within the Boer community do not seem to have 
corresponded very exactly to these social divisions. Wealthy Boers led changing 
factions, which coalesced over an issue, but had no permanence. On the issue of 
relations with the Portuguese government, however, there was a clear tendency for 
the richer Boers to be on the government's side. (29) This was undoubtedly related 
to the fact that access to the administmtion brought rich rewards, in the form of 
land concessions, hunting and rifle licences, commissions for mercenary service, 
contracts for public works and government haulage, and many others. (30) 
Rivalries over state patronage seem also to have underlain the tensions 
between Afrikaser and Portuguese settlers. In the early 1890s, when both Afrikaner 
and Madeiran settlement were reaching a peak, the economy of the Huila highlands was 
suddenly affected by a dramatic cut-back in government spending and a very severe 
drought. The white population competed desperately for what state jobs remained 
available. (31) It was precisely at this time that fights between Boers and 
Madeirans became frequent, and that maximum tension between the two groups was 
observed. (32) The situation calmed down with the trek to Damaraland of 30 Boer 
families, the repatriation of many Madeirans to their native island, and a slight 
recovery in the economic situation. (33) 
It is important to stress that divisions within the white settler 
population were not necessarily on national lines. In 1889 the Madeirans and Boers 
of Hunrpata combined to protest vehemently that the Lubango settlement was being 
favoured by the government at the expense of Humpata. (34) Boers and Portuguese 
united to protest at the governmentfs support of the Mossamedes Company in the 
Cassinga gold mines dispute in the 1890s. (35) And many non-Afrikaner whites were 
linked to the Boers by close economic ties, in particular the multinational trading 
community, which depended on the Boers for transport. (36) Thus, although national 
cleavages existed within the white population, they were nothing like as prevalent 
as Portuguese historiogcaphy would have it. 
This was true even in the social and cultural relations between the various 
white groups. The Boers tenaciously clung to their limguage, customs and religion, 
but they were prepared to welcome other whites into their community. Many English 
traders had Boer wives and were members of the Dutch Reformed Church, and there are 
two documented cases of Portuguese officials marrying Boer girls 2n the Reformed 
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rites. (37) This was in part a response to a peculiar demographic problem. As the 
Boer women remained all the year round in the healthy highlands, their death rate 
was much lower than that of their men folk, who spent much of the year hunting, 
fighting and transport riding in the feve+ridden lowlands. (38) As there was a 
corresponding surplus of single males among the traders and the Portuguese, the 
pressures towards mixed marriages were strong. Some Boers disapproved of this (39), 
but it was generally accepted, and the son of one of the Portuguese-Boer marriages 
was successfully assimilated into the Boer community. (40) 
Nor did the Boers reject the Portuguese language or the Roman Catholic 
mission completely. Many Boers were keen to have a teacher from whom they could 
learn Portuguese, perhaps for business purposes, and were p-pared to send their 
children to the lay schools. More surprisingly, the Boers even contemplated sending 
their children to the Roman Catholic mission school. (41) Indeed, the Boerst thirst 
for education seems sometimes to have overridden cultural and religious prejudice. 
The prejudice that the Boers were most loth to abandon was their deep- 
seated racism. Yet even here certain contradictions were apparent. The conflicts 
with the gxeat Ovimbundu and Ovambo kingdoms on Portuguese militasy exped.i.tions were 
extremely violent, but were conducive to a form of respect of either side for the 
other. The Boers almost admired the Ovambo, whom they considered to be the most 
courageous and warlike Africans in southern Africa after the Zulu. (42) And the 
Africans still recall today the bravery and skill of the fearsome trekkers. (43) 
Relations with the Africans in the areas where the Boers actually settled 
were far more bitter. The first trekkers expelled large numbers of Mwila from some 
of the best la;nds in the Huila highlands, and plundered their herds to replenish 
decimated stocks. The displaced Mwila re-tired into inaccessible mountains and 
forests, and carried on a protracted guerilla war with the whites, particularly 
violent in the 1880s and 1890s, but lasting through into the 1920s. (44) A similar 
situation occursed among the Kalukembe in the Caconda area. (45) But even this 
picture of hatred a d  conflict should not be drawn too strongly, for we also find 
soups of Boe-rs acting as mercenaries for one Mwila chief in his wars with other 
Mwila. (46) h d  it is paradoxical that the headman of the Humpata area should have 
turned himself into an independent king and increased his influence considerably 
during the pe~iod of Boer settlement. (47) 
The last aspect of this frontier society that I wish to focus on concerns 
the Boersr relations with their non-white servants and clients. The labour employed 
by the Boers fell into two sharply distinguished categories. Unskilled agricultural 
labomers were slaves, bought in the interior, m d  "freed" and "contractedt1 
according to the formal requirements of Portuguese law. Sometimes they were also 
seised by force or by ruse when on hunting expeditions, and some Boers did a 1ittl.e 
slave trading on the side. These slaves were extremely harshly treated by their 
Boer masters, and there were several cases of revolting cruelty. It was even said 
that the Boers treated their animals far better than their slaves. (48) 
In clear contrast to thie were the Boersl relations with their skilled 
servants and clients, waggon-drivers, artisans, hunters and others, who fomed a 
very heterogeneous g~oup. Some were promising slave children, whom the Boers trained 
with seat care. Others were servants who had come with them from the Transvaal, 
the "tame folk". Then there were the clients, mainly Rehobother Basters and Herero, 
who had come with the traders from Namibia in the 1880s, bringing with them a 
heteroclite collection of Khoi and Twa dependants, and who had settled in autonomous 
commities in the Huila highlands. (49) All in all, these various groups were 
estimated at about 400 adult males in the mid-1890s. (50) These clients had similar 
skills to those of the Boers, and tended to enter into competition with their patrons 
on certain occasions. But culturally they were in many ways closer to the Boers than 
any white group. The "tame folk" were not only Afrikaans-speaking but also members 
of the Dutch Reformed Church, and the Rehobother Basters were exceedingly similar in 
all respects to their Boer cousins. The generalized use of Afrikaavls by the whole of 
this poup was indeed a source of irritation to the Portuguese authorities. (51) 
In view of this close cultural similarity, it is not entirely surprising 
to see a certain mininal relaxation of the sLgid ideological racism of the trekkers. 
Ln 1907 we find "Ou Booi Baster" included in the list of Boer mercenaries by v a  der 
Merwe. (52) In the early days William Jordan, of English-Coloured parentage, was 
accepted as a member of the Boer community, in view of the services he had rendered 
to the tre&ers. (53) In 1897 a Boer girl married a Portuguese chefe, who had two 
mulatto lqbroth.ersty. (54) There was even a case of a dissolute Boer woman, mistress 
of a Portuguese official, who orpized wild orgies with the African labourers. (55) 
More importmt was the provision in the Boer internal regulations of 1890 that no man 
with coloured blaod "up to the tenth generation" could hold office, which suggests 
that some members of the community did have coloured blood. (56) 
This last point, however, serves to underline just how minimal the 
deviations from strict racism were. This is shown even more clearly by the story of 
the c h m h  split of 1908. In 1884 the Boers had expelled the "tame folk" from the 
settlement and church community of Humpata. (57) Since then they had lived in their 
own settlement, 8 kilometres aww, with their own predikants and teachers. But in 
1908 a predikant, Dr Pasch, was sent by the Cape synod to serve both communities. 
This created a furore among the Boers, and when in the heat of the moment Dr Pasch 
cried out 'Whites stink as much as Kaffirs", he was nearly lynched. Only three Boers 
out of the whole community stood by Dr Pasch. (58) 
As for the Portuguese settler community in southern Angola, two different 
patterns of relations with Africans mw be distinguished, In the oases, fisheries 
and toms of the coastal strip, there was practically no indigenous African 
population, and the transition from slavery to contract labour in the 1870s meant 
almost nothing in concrete terns until 1913. The hierarchical plantation structure 
was all-pervasive, and there reigned in Mossamedes and its immediate hinterland a 
racism more harsh and systematic than anywhere else in Angola. Indeed, Mossamedes 
was the only town to practise strict segregation in schools and residential areas.(59) 
The situation in the highlands was quite different. The Madeiran neighbours of the 
Boers lived off subsistence agriculture (based on the sweet potato), employment in 
the state bureaucracy, mercenary service, transport, and trade with the Africans. 
Relations with Africans were generally relaxed, for the Madei*ans treated the few 
labourers they employed as members of the family, and they possessed few cattle to 
compete with African herds for pastures or water. Disputes over agricultural land 
and over sharp dealing in commercial transitions were the major areas of conflict in 
the economic sphere. In social relations, mulattos were accepted as members of the 
Portuguese community, and, owing to the slight surplus of white men, mulatto girls 
were particularly soUght for in marriage. Extra-marital sexual relations with 
mulattos and. blacks were very prevalent, and widely accepted, in spite of the 
f'ulminations of the Catholic missionaries. (60) Almeida, the major Portuguese 
trader of the highlands, was extremely proud of his 32 mulatto children. (61) 
The difference in Boer and Madeiran attitudes to the race problem strongly 
suggests that social patterns in the white group were influenced, but not narrowly 
detemined, by economic conditions. If one accepts the notion that economic and 
social structures are separate and autonomous (62), and that racism is fundamentally 
a psycho-social phenomenon (63), it remains to be seen how economic and social 
structures were articulated within the Boer community. Roughly speaking, one can say 
that the Angola Boers displa~red strong progressive and capitalist tendencies in the 
economic field, while maintaining a static, or even regressive social system. This 
latter phenomenon can undoubtedly be linked to the Dopper religion of the majority 
of the Angola Boers, with its reduction of cultural texts to the single bible, and 
even to the psalms within the bible. (64) The cultural atropw of the Transvaal 
Doppers could only be intensified by even greater isolation in the midst of a Latin 
Catholic culture, which they completely rejected. The disfunctional nature of this 
social system appeared most clearly at the moment of crisis in the economic history 
of the Boers. They were incapable of making the crucial transition from waggons to 
lorries, in spite of the experience and capital built up over thirty years. More 
generally, they never managed to convert their monopoly over the transport system 
into a strong position in the process of long-distance trade. They exploited the 
skills that they already possessed, but seemed incapable of adapting to new 
situations by acquiring new skills. In the 1920s they were thus left with only two 
solutions. The majority accepted the charity and feathe-bedding which the Union 
government offered them in Namibia. (65) The rest remained in Angola, and declined 
slowly into the condition of a degenerate poor white community, despised and 
rejected by all. (66) 
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